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Abstract
The information system (T.V., newspapers, blogs, social network platforms) and its inner dy-
namics play a fundamental role on the evolution of collective debates and thus on the public
opinion. In this work we address such a process focusing on how the current inner strategies of
the information system (competition, customer satisfaction) once combined with the gossip may
affect the opinions’ dynamics. A reinforcement effect is particularly evident in the social network
platforms where several and incompatible ”cultures” coexist (e.g, pro or against the existence
of chemical trails and reptilians, the new world order conspiracy and so forth). We introduce a
computational model of opinion dynamics which accounts for the coexistence of media and gos-
sip as separated but interdependent mechanisms influencing the opinions’ evolution. Individuals
may change their opinions under the contemporary pressure of the information supplied by the
media and the opinions of their social contacts. We stress the effect of the media communication
patterns by considering both the simple case where each medium mimics the behavior of the
most successful one (in order to maximize the audience) and the case where there is polarization
and thus competition among media reported information (in order to preserve and satisfy their
segmented audience). Finally, we first model the information cycle as in the case of traditional
main stream media – i.e, when every medium knows about the format of all the others – and
then, to account for the effect of the Internet, on more complex connectivity patterns – as in the
case of the web based information. We show that multiple and polarized information sources
lead to stable configurations where several and distant opinions coexist.
Introduction
Nowadays, there is an ongoing intense scientific debate around the definition of the foundational
concepts as well as about the most appropriate methodological approaches to deal with the un-
derstanding of social dynamics [1, 2]. However, the challenge of understanding human behavior
remains complex and intricate. Humans are intentional (and not necessarily rational) and the
their dynamics in the social space are influenced by the surrounding social context and even
by the information reported on the media. Tv, newspapers, blogs act on the memetic diffusion
which, in turn, is affected by a massive amount of individual and social factors – e.g. tastes,
desires, goals, trust, social pressure etc. To understand such mechanisms we have to consider
2several factors from how information is produced, up to how the various information sources
interact within them (and with respect to the audience). Since such an interaction manifests in
terms of production and selection of proposed contents, we introduce a novel model of opinion
dynamics on coupled and interacting networks. We stress the role of the media content produc-
tion strategies by considering both the simple case where each media mimics the behavior of the
most successful one (in order to maximize the audience) and the case where there is polarization
and thus competition among media reported information (in order to preserve and satisfy the
segmented audience and to follow the editorial line).
The increasingly massive use of Internet as a source of information and as a medium of
communication has lead to a shift of paradigm in the production/diffusion of contents as well as
in the communication process. The debate about social relevant issues spreads and persists over
the web by leading to the emergence of unprecedented social phenomena such as the massive
recruitment of people around common interests, ideas or political visions [3–6]. In the past years
an intensive research effort has been payed in understanding social phenomena from innovation
diffusion, to social influence, up to opinions and their dynamics [7–17]; some of them have
focused on the role of media [18–23] and of the web [24–26].
The interaction among media, with the advent of the WWW, has been subject to an impor-
tant change: people are not passive anymore, but can be proactive to an extent that often main
stream media acquire information directly by common people. Main stream media compete for
the audience and therefore interact by adjusting their format/contents to collect the highest
number of followers. Hence, if on the one hand people get informed by the media, on the other
hand the information (as well as the way they are reported) are even more influenced by the
evolution of the mass tastes. Media respond to the their editors which often are politically lined
up and then we can have the emergence of monopoles (as in the case of regimes) or to polarized
groups (as in the modern democracies) of information broadcasters aiming at influencing people
toward one or another political party [18, 27]. The aim of this work is a) to introduce in the
field of opinion dynamics the role of the media dynamics as a results of a competition/imitation
process which has the goal to reach the highest number of followers; b) to highlight the changes
induced by the historical evolution of the information system from the traditional main stream
media to the WWW and c) to study the effect of aggregation/fragmentation of opinions in mixed
communication environment.
Since we want to stress the role of trust with respect to information available to an individual,
we assume that the gossipers interact with their neighbors and with the media using the bounded
confidence model (BCM) [28] – i.e, only if the distance between their internal state (opinion) and
the received information is below a given threshold σ (tolerance) they will be more likely to adjust
their own opinion. The higher the tolerance, the more the people are likely to be influenced by
(because they trust) the information circulating. On the other hand, the media aim to reach the
highest number of followers, hence they change their message according to the attitude of the
media with the highest number of followers. Finally, we introduce competition among media
memes [29,30] – i.e., we mark the edges between media with positive and negative values causing
respectively to converge or diverge respect to their neighbor’s attitudes. We show that multiple
and polarized information sources can lead to stationary configurations where several opinions
coexist.
3The model
The model discussed in this paper relies on two interacting networks: the media, which have the
goal to collect the highest number of followers, and the gossipers, which can acquire information
both from other gossipers and by the media. For the sake of simplicity, we imagine that the
frequencies with which gossipers exchange opinions among themselves and consult the media
are the same; thus, at each time-step both gossipers and media can adjust their opinions (figure
1). We assume that gossipers are likely to adjust their opinion only if the received information
and their own beliefs are close enough, a situation referred as bounded confidence. Media,
assumed to be more audience oriented, try to mimic the most successfull medium, i.e. the ones
with the largest number of followers. The number of followers, i.e. of individuals which accept
the information reported on by the medium, is updated at each time step. Every gossipers
and media are initially assigned a random opinion described by a real value within a given
opinion space [0..1]. Mathematical models of opinion dynamics under bounded confidence have
been introduced by Axelrod in [31] and then developed by Deffuant and Weisbuch [28] and by
Hegselmann and Krause [32].
Figure 1. A graphical sketch of our model. (Left panel) Gossipers interact among themselves
choosing a neighbor in their social network (double arrow). If the gossipers have similar ideas,
their opinion will converge further (eq.1). (Central panel) Gossipers are also influenced by the
media: when they are exposed to information, their opinion will converge to such information
if it is not too far from the gossiper’s initial opinion (eq.2). (Right panel) Media are subject to
a leader-follower dynamics. Media are supposed to have a network of other media with which
interact either trying to copy their memes (black lines) or trying to oppose their memes (red
dashed lines). Each media chooses to mimic/oppose the most successful (the one with more
followers) of its neighboring media (eq.3).
We consider two interacting networks: the gossiper network Gg and the media network Gm.
Gossipers interact through the bounded confidence model (BCM) of Deffuant and Weisbuch [28]
- i.e., at each time step t a gossiper i chooses at random a neighbor j in its social network and
adjusts its opinion according to
4xt+1i = x
t
i + µgg
(
xtj − x
t
i
)
θ
(
σgg − |x
t
j − x
t
i|
)
(1)
where xi is the opinion of the gossipers i, µgg is a convergence factor, σgg is the threshold
(opinion distance) above which gossipers do not interact and θ( ) is Heaviside’s theta function.
We assume that also the interaction with the media has a BCM form:
xt+1i = x
t
i + µgm
(
ytk − x
t
i
)
θ
(
σgm − |y
t
k − x
t
i|
)
(2)
Here k is a randomly chosen media, yk is the information (meme) reported by the k-th media,
µgm is a convergence factor and σgm is the threshold below which gossipers gets influenced by
the media.
The media choice at time t is described by the matrix ξtik that is equals to 1 if the i-th
gossiper has chosen the k-th media, 0 otherwise; i.e. ξtik is a binary random variable that takes
the value ξtik = 1 with probability 1/M and ξ
t
ik = 0 otherwise. We can therefore count the
followers of each media as
f tk =
∑
i
ξtikθ
(
σgm − |y
t
k − x
t
i|
)
(3)
where ξt is calculated at each time-step.
We then introduce our max-audience oriented bounded confidence model among media inter-
acting on a (possibly signed) network described by the matrix with elements Jkq ∈ {−1, 0,+1}.
While the matrix |Jkq| correspond to the adjacency matrix of the network, the sign of Jkq indi-
cates the polarization (friend/enemy) between the k-th and the q-the media. The case Jkq ≥ 0
corresponds to unpolarized media.
First, the meme of the k-th media is influenced by the most successful (the leader) l (k) of
its neighbors neigh(k) = {q : |Jkq| > 0}
l (k) = max
q∈neigh(k)
{|Jkq|fq} (4)
and then its meme is updated accorded a signed version of the BCM model:
yt+1k = B
[
ytk + µmmJkl(k)
(
ytl(k) − y
t
k
)
θ
(
σmm − |y
t
l(k) − y
t
k|
)]
(5)
where the function
B (y) =


0
y
1
if
y < 0
0 < y < 1
y > 1
(6)
constrains the memes in the interval [0, 1]; this is necessary as for Jkq < 0 the memes among
the k-th and the q-th media tend to diverge and could therefore go below 0 or beyond 1.
Notice that the convergence factors µαβ with α, β ∈ {g,m} correspond to the timescales of
the dynamics. In our study, we always use µαβ = 0.3 and σgg = σgm = σmg = σ
Since the opinion space [0, 1] is continuous, we can have different configuration in the final
stationary opinion state. Opinions’ clusters could be one (consensus), two (polarization), or more
(fragmentation). In the following, we will first consider media as audience oriented agencies
5without any particular competition among them – i.e., a situation in which the opinion of
a medium converges to the most successful among its’ neighbors. Then, we will introduce
competition among media memes – i.e., according to the structural balance of Heider [33], we
mark the edges between media with positive and negative values as in [34–36] causing respectively
a step toward or far from the most followed neighboring medium.
Results and Discussion
An analysis reveals that the our model is not amenable of a simple analytical solution not even
at the mean-field level (see Supporting information); therefore, we have resort on numerical
investigations of the model. The key for a correct understanding of how the dynamics works
in our model is to evaluate the interplay of the mechanism of imitation at the local and global
scales of the network. To shed light to the inner mechanisms of the dynamics, we will use very
simple networks where the two levels are clearly discernible.
We performed a thorough simulation program which considers different connectivity pat-
terns for the two interacting layers (gossipers and media networks). We first show the opinion
dynamics in the case where gossipers are subject to the audience oriented media broadcasting.
Then, we introduce competition (polarization) in the media dynamics - i.e, each node of the
media network, depending on the edge signature (positive or negative), can diverge (or converge)
to (or from) the value of the most followed media. Both the audience-oriented and the compet-
ing media cases are first considered in the complete graph case. This is the case of traditional
main stream media where everybody knows about everybody. Finally, we consider the model’s
dynamics when nodes of the media networks are linked through more complex connectivity
patterns like in the case of the WWW.
The nodes of the gossipers network interact over a scale-free network generated with the
Barabasi-Albert [37] model that sets the exponent of the power law distribution to be 3.0.
We explored also other connectivity patterns (Watts-Strogatz small world networks [38] with
different rewiring probability) noticing that the underlying topology does not affect the model
qualitative behavior.
We explore the model dynamics in terms of opinion distance and number of clusters as a
function of the tolerance parameter. Each point of the parameter space (5000 steps) is aver-
aged over 100 different possible initial configurations to attain the desired accuracy. When not
specified, the size of the networks is to be assumed to be 104 nodes.
Traditional main-stream media
The size of actors in traditional main-stream media (TMSM )is small: the number of televisions,
radio stations, newspapers etc. allows everybody to check what the others are doing. For this
reason, we will model interactions among the TMSM as a complete graph.
We first analyze the trend of opinions’ extremal distances d – i.e., the distance between
the highest and the lowest opinions in the gossipers’ network – as a function of the tolerance
σ. When d = 0, all the gossipers have reached consensus and share the same opinion while for
d > 0, opinions are distributed; in the case of the standard BCM model, opinions are distributed
in clusters (delta functions) separated by a distance higher than σ.
6In Figure 2 we show the trend of the opinion distance (the highest opinion distance) as a
function of the tolerance when the gossipers’ network is scale-free [37]. We have checked that
qualitatively similar results hold for the other gossip network topologies. It is known that the
increasing of the tolerance parameter causes a reduction of the distance within opinions until it
reduces to consensus – i.e, when the distance is 0 – and that the critical point (without media)
is reached for value of tolerance of 0.5 [39].
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1000 Media
Figure 2. Maximal opinion distance d (the difference between the highest and lowest opinion
in the gossipers’ network) versus tolerance σ. The size of the simbols is bigger than the error
bars. Opinions’ distance under the effect of audience-oriented unpolarized media shows a
smoothening of the transition (less sharp change of d versus σ).
Here, we show that the media action smoothens the transition. In fact, the presence of the
media as audience oriented information agencies can enlarge the transition area before the con-
sensus to a single opinion. Such an effect is more evident for a small number of media. However,
whether the interaction among different networks could change the order of the transition as in
the case infrastructural networks [40] remains an open question.
The situation is completely different when we introduce competition (polarization) in the
media information targeting mechanisms. In fact, in this scenario media can have negative or
positive feedbacks from the other media; therefore the most popular medium can cause either a
convergence (positive coupling) or divergence (negative coupling) of its neighbors’ memes. For
the sake of simplicity we set to 0.5 the fraction of negative links of the media network – i.e, the
number of link that will cause divergence with respect to the most followed media message.
To measure the possible sparsity of opinions induced by the negative links, we bin the opinion
7space in a probability vector φ and measure the localization parameter [41]:
L =
(∑
i
φ2i
)2
∑
i
φ4i
(7)
If MB is the (large) number of bins of the probability vector, L ∼ 1/MB ∼ 0 if the opinions are
evenly distributed, while L = 1 if all the opinions are concentrated in a single bin. In general,
if opinions are evenly distributed in NC clusters, L
−1 ∼ NC is of the order of the number of
different opinions.
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Figure 3. Localization L versus tolerance σ. Error bars are of the order of the symbol size.
The localization parameter can be thought as the inverse of the number of different opinion;
therefore L = 1 for consensus, while a low value of L signals fragmentation of the opinions.
(Left panel) Localization in gossip scale-free networks increases with the tolerance when the
media are audience oriented agencies (i.e. unpolarized). Notice that full consensus (L = 1) is
reached at a tolerance ∼ 0.5 like the single-network BCM model case. (Right panel)
Localization has a non-monotonic trend when media are polarized; in particular, it reaches a
maximum before the tolerance is maximal (σ = 1). Like in the BCM model, opinions are
fragmented at low values of σ since they do not interact; unlike the BCM model, consensus is
not reached at high values of σ and opinions are fragmented due to the polarization of the
media.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows that for unsigned interactions among media, all the opinions
converge to a single one, i.e. L = 1 for high values of σ. Notice that in the case of a large
number of unpolarised media, two opinion clusters (L ∼ 0.5) cohexists at small σ’s (rougly
between σ = 0.05 and σ = 0.10). The right panel of Figure 3 shows a re-entrant effect in
which the opinion space is maximally fragmented for both low and high values of the tolerance
σ. However, such fragmentation stems from different mechanisms; in fact, while at low σ
opinion fragment into distinct non-interacting peaks as in the standard BCM , at values of
tolerance the opinions fragment because the competition among polarised memes. In fact, at
8high σ we find that while the average number of opinion peaks is stationary, their positions
in the opinion space are dynamically fluctuating. Therefore, in the case of polarized media,
even total trust in the information (σ = 1) does not produce full consensus as in the standard
BCM , but induces a dynamically evolving stationary state in which actors can still change their
opinions. Polarization triggers a sort of never-ending collective debate supported by different
and incompatible argumentations, not allowing people to find an agreement such as in the case
of the existence or not of chemical trails or the link between vaccines and autism [42,43].
New media information
The use of the Internet as a medium for sharing information has caused a shifting of paradigm
from main stream centralized media to a more distributed and proactive protocol of information
diffusion. At difference with traditional main-stream media, new media are composed of a large
number of actors that cannot possibly check all the other media but that interact among each
other through a social network. Hence, in this last scenario we use different topologies for the
media network – i.e, of 104 nodes with scale-free and small-world topologies (the latter with
rewiring probabilities p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) – acting on a gossip scale-free gossip network of the same
size. We analyze both polarized (audience oriented) and unpolarized (competing) media; in the
former case, for the sake of simplicity we set to 0.5 the fraction of negative links in the media
network. Figure 4 shows the behavior of the localization for scale free media networks and small
world topologies. The high number of media makes extreme the effects evinced in the previous
scenarios.
We observe that the result for new media are qualitatively similar to the ones for the tradi-
tional main-stream media: in both cases competition among the media (polarization) introduces
a non monotonic behavior in opinions’ fragmentation, gossipers never reach consensus and the
minimum opinion spread is reached for values of tolerance σ < 1.
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
L
BA
WS p = 0.1
WS p = 0.2
WS p = 0.3
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Figure 4. Localization L versus tolerance σ for Barabasi-Albert scale-free (BA) and
Watts-Strogatz small world (WS) networks with rewiring probabilities p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. Error
bars are of the order of the symbol size. The complex networks of gossipers and media are of
comparable sizes. (Left panel) For un-polarized media, increasing the tolerance leads toward
consensun (L = 1). (Right panel) Polarization among the media produces a reentrant effect on
the localization: while at low values of σ opinions are fragmented since they do not interact, at
high values of the tolerance polarization induces fragmentation.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce a novel model of opinion dynamics accounting for the coexistence of
media and of social influence as two separated but interdependent processes. People (nodes of the
gossip network) interact with their neighbors or with the media using the Bounded Confidence
Model (BCM) [28] – i.e, only they will influence each other only if the distance between their
opinions is below a given threshold σ (tolerance), the higher σ, the more people are likely to
be influenced. In turn, the media (nodes of the media network) aim to capture the highest
number of followers, hence they change their message by moving toward the value of the media
with the highest number of followers. Finally, we introduce competition among media through
polarization - i.e., media can interact with positive sign (their memes will converge) or negative
sign (their memes will diverge).
We show that, when the media follow an audience oriented strategy of information delivery
(i.e. everybody tries to mimic the most successful medium), there is a smoothening of consensus
transition, indicating that the media messages tend to produce an impasse when amplified by the
gossip dynamics. Such effect tends to disappear with increasing the number of media. On the
other hand, competition (polarization) among media produces a fragmentation of the opinions’
space thus preventing a system-wide consensus. Such scenario is qualitatively robust to changes
in the topologies of the gossip-gossip and medium-medium interaction network; in particular,
it stays true both for conventional media (where everybody can interact with everybody) and
for new media (where interactions take the form of a social network). Finally, we notice that
our choice of keeping equal the σ values is better suited to disentagle the contribution of the
competition among the media to opinion fragmentation. Varying the tolerance parameters,
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other routes could be possible; as an example, a very small tolerance σmm among the media
(conservative media) could keep opinions fragmented even for tolerances σgg among the gossipers
beyond the consensus transition.
The next envisioned step will be to fine tune our model with real data from social networks
platforms where main stream media directly interact with users and together change continu-
ously the opinions’ as well as the information space.
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Supporting Information
Algorithm
The gossip network Gg = (Vg, Eg) is composed by N = |Vg| gossipers; the edges Eg represent
social contacts among gossipers. Nodes of the gossip network interact with randomly selected
a neighbor by applying the following rule: Given a node i that has selected a node j, having
respectively opinion xi and xj (the opinion varies in a continuous space between 0.0 and 1.0)
for all i ∈ Vg do
select random neighbor j
if |xti − x
t
j| < σgg then
xt+1i ← x
t
i + µgg ∗ (x
t
j − x
t
i)
where σgg is the threshold parameter (the distance between one is likely to consider the others
opinions) and µgg is a convergence parameter varying in the interval (0, 1/2].
The media network Gm = (Vm, Em) is composed by M = |Vm| media and follows a similar
rule except for the tolerance control. Each node α of the media network has an opinion yα
selects in its neighborhood the one that has the highest number of followers (audience) and then
apply the updating. Given two media i, j ∈ Vm
for all α ∈ Vm do
select most influential neighbor β
if |ytβ − y
t
α| < σmm then
yt+1α = y
t
α + µmm ∗ Jαβ ∗ (y
t
β − y
t
α)
if yt+1α < 0 then
yt+1α = 0
if yt+1α > 1 then
yt+1α = 1
where Jαβ = ±1 represent the polarization among the media.
The set of edges Egm ⊂ Vg × Vm represents the media followed by the gossipers; i.e. an
edge (i, α) ∈ Egm means that gossiper i can be influenced by the media α. The inter-network
dynamics takes place by gossipers choosing at random a media among the ones they follow:
for all i ∈ Vg do
select random media α
if |xti − y
t
α| < σgm then
xt+1i ← x
t
i + µgm ∗ (y
t
α − x
t
i)
Thus, each node of the gossip network talks with his friend and then gets informed by the
media (by randomly selecting one node from the media network) In such a mechanism: a) a
leader-follower dynamics emerges among media the messages delivered by the media; b) the
gossip network and the media network have a feedback loop.
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Mean Field equations
A simple analytical tool that help to understand the main features of network-based models like
our coupled BCM are the mean field (MF) approximations.
We will first sketch the MF solution in the general case of aBCM subject to a time dependent
external field (information from the media). Let {xi} be the N opinions of the crowd and {yk}
the M opinions (memes) of the media with xi, yk ∈ (0, 1). Let’s suppose that at each step an
individual i can get information by another randomly chosen person j with probability αg or by
a randomly chosen media k with probability αm, with αi + αm = 1. The individual then gets
influenced by the other opinion with probability cg (x, y) by individuals and cm (x, y) by media:
xi →
{
xi + µgg (xj − xi) with probability αg · cg (x, y)
xi + µgm (hk − xi) with probability αm · cm (x, y)
(8)
where cg and cm are functions that measure the interaction strenghts among different opinions.
Notice that the standard BCM corresponds to αg = 1 and cg (x, y) = 1 − θ (σgg − |x− y|),
where θ (x) is the Heavyside theta-function and σgg is the tolerance parameter of the BCM
model. Let pg (x, t) and pm (x, t) be the probability distribution of individual opinions and of
media opinions at time t. Rescaling the time by the average rate at which individuals receive
informations, the evolution of the individual opinion distribution pg (x, t) is described by the
master equation
∂tpg (x, t) =
∫
dy
∫
dz pg (y, t)
∑
s∈{g,m}
αs cs (y, z) ps (z, t) [δ (x− µgsz − (1− µgs) y)− δ (x− y)]
(9)
Notice that in the BCM case with the standard choice µgg = 1/2, eq. 9 reduces to the MF
equations
∂tpg (x, t) =
∫
dy
∫
|y−z|<σgg
dz pg (y, t) pg (z, t)
[
δ
(
x−
(y + z)
2
)
− δ (x− y)
]
(10)
derived for the BCM model by Ben-naim and coauthors [44]. Let’s now consider for simplicity
the case in which cg (x, y) = cm (x, y) = 1−θ (σ − |x− y|) and the distribution of media opinions
is time independent. It is easy to check that to the field pm (x) =
∑
δ (x− yk) with |yk −
yl| > σ ∀k, l there corresponds the stationary solution pg (x) = pm (x). Notice that the MF
approximation comes from disregarding joint correlations among the opinions, i.e.
p (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xiL) =
L∏
k=1
p (xik) (11)
We will now consider the general case in which the dynamics of the media is coupled to the
dynamics of the opinions. Such a case can be described by adding to eq. 9 an equation for the
field evolution
∂tpm (y, t) = F [pg, pm, t] (12)
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where in the MF approximation F is a functional of the pα only. For the media-media leader-
follower dynamics, one has to understand which is the meme that has the maximum number of
followers. Disregarding fluctuations, this can be calculated as
hmax = sup
h
pm (y)
∫ h+σ
h−σ
pg (x) dx (13)
and the dynamics for the memes is
∂tpm (y, t) =
∫
dz pm (z, t) cm (z, hmax) [δ (y − µmmz − (1− µmm)hmax)− δ (y − z)] (14)
Eq. 13 makes the mean-field system of equation not amenable of simple solutions.
A further refinement of the MF approach would be needed in the case of competing media: in
such a case, it is well known that even at the MF level more complicated techniques like the cavity
method or the replica trick are needed to solve systems with competing interactions [45,46].
